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Abstract
Approval voting is the voting procedure that selects the candidates who
get the most votes in a society where voters are allowed to approve of as
many candidates as they wish. In this study, we focus on approval voting
as a social choice correspondence which selects the alternatives that at given
preference profile there exists admissible and sincere approval profile such
that the voting procedure selects. We study Maskin monotonic refinements
of approval voting in order to find its minimal refinement. We construct a
social choice correspondence based on the number of approvals; and we show
the properties of this refinement.
O¨zet
Onaylı sec¸im oy kullananların istedig˘i sayıda adaya oy vermesine izin
verilen bir toplulukta en fazla oy alan adayın galip geldig˘i sec¸im prosedu¨ru¨du¨r.
Bu c¸alıs¸mada Onaylı sec¸im, bu prosedu¨r tarafından verilen tercih profiline
go¨re yapılan olası kabul edilebilir ve samimi oylamalarda kazanabilecek aday-
ları sec¸en ku¨me deg˘erli sosyal sec¸im kuralı olarak ele alınmıs¸tır. Onaylı
sec¸imin minimal rafineles¸tirmesini bulmak ic¸in Maskin monoton rafineles¸tirmeleri
u¨zerine c¸alıs¸tık, ve kullanılan oyların sayısına bag˘lı olan bir ku¨me deg˘erli
sosyal sec¸im kuralı olus¸turarak; bu rafineles¸tirmenin o¨zelliklerini inceledik.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Approval voting is a voting procedure that selects the candidate which
gets most votes while voters are allowed to vote for as many candidates as
they want. Approval voting or voting systems within the spirit of Approval
voting were used through the history. For example, Lines (1986) shows the
role of Approval voting in the election of Doge of Venice for more than five
hundred years. Although been practically used for such a long time, Approval
voting was formally defined and its properties were analysed for the first time
by Brams and Fishburn (1978). Five years after their article, Brams and Fish-
burn published a seminal book about Approval voting (Brams and Fishburn
1983). Among their book, Brams and Fishburn published several papers
about Approval voting. For example, Brams and Fishburn (1981) study
the efficacy and equity concepts for Approval voting; Brams and Fishburn
(1992) examine elections of four scientific and engineering societies that used
Approval voting between 1987 and 1988; and Brams and Fishburn (2005)
discuss Approval votings adoption by societies.
Brams and Fishburn were not the only academicians who were inter-
ested in Approval voting. For example; Weber (1995) published his thoughts
about Approval voting; Alos-Ferrer (2006) discusses Approval voting as bal-
lot aggregation function and he states that it is the only one that satisfies
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faithfulness, consistency and cancellation; Laslier and Straeten (2008) study
the experiment about Approval voting which took place during the 2002
French presidential election; and Laslier (2009) examines behaviours of vot-
ers in Approval voting when the society is very large. Lately Laslier and
Sanver published a book entitled “Handbook on Approval Voting”, which
summarizes the literature on Approval voting (Laslier and Sanver 2010).
Approval voting is a voting procedure which is defined on sets of approved
alternatives. To extend spirit of Approval voting into usual social choice
framework; we take into account voters preference relations and the infor-
mation of how many candidates they will approve. Then we define approval
voting as a social choice correspondence, where it selects the set of alterna-
tives that can be selected by voting procedure in some admissible and sincere
approval profile. Approval voting, which is defined on preference profile, has
a very nice property; it satisfies Maskin monotonicity that is necessary con-
dition for a social choice correspondence to be Nash implementable (Maskin
1999). Despite this nice property, Approval voting has a disadvantage; it
selects a large set of alternatives. So, we want to refine Approval voting,
while we preserve Maskin monotonicity. To refine Approval voting without
losing Maskin monotonicity, we construct a social choice correspondence, the
refined approval voting, depends on the number of approvals, and show this
correspondence is a Maskin monotonic refinement of Approval voting .
This thesis is organized as follows; Chapter 2 gives basic definitions and
notations that will be used in the following chapters. Chapter 3 mentions
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Maskin monotonicity, and some properties of Maskin monotonic social choice
correspondences. Finally, Chapter 4 gives formal definition of Approval vot-
ing, and mentions our findings on refinements of Approval voting.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we give basic definitions and notations that are used in
this thesis.
The set N = {1, ..., n} with n ≥ 2 denotes the society which confronts a
set of alternatives A = {a1, ..., am} with m ≥ 2.
Definition 2.1 Given any two sets S and T , their Cartesian product is the
set S × T = {(s, t)|s ∈ S and t ∈ T}. An element of a Cartesian product is
called an ordered pair.
Definition 2.2 Given a set S, a binary relation R on S is a subset of the
Cartesian product S × S. An ordered pair (x, y) ∈ R is interpreted as x is
related with y.
Notation 2.1 Given a set S, and for any a, b ∈ S; we will simplify the
notation (a, b) ∈ R by aRb.
Definition 2.3 Given a set S, a binary relation R on S is complete if and
only if ∀x, y ∈ S, we have xRy or yRx.
Definition 2.4 Given a set S, a binary relation R on S is transitive if and
only if ∀x, y, z ∈ S, we have xRy and yRz ⇒ xRz.
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Definition 2.5 Given a set S, a binary relation R on S is antisymmetric if
and only if ∀x, y ∈ S, we have xRy and yRx⇒ x = y.
Definition 2.6 Strict preference relation of an individual i ∈ N over the
alternative set A is a complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation
Pi ∈ Π, where Π is the set of complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary
relations over A. Then P = (P1, ..., Pn) ∈ ΠN stands for the preference
profile of society.
Definition 2.7 Given a strict preference relation Pi over A; the lower con-
tour set of alternative x ∈ A with respect to Pi is the set
L(x;Pi) = {y ∈ A : xPiy}.
Definition 2.8 The rank of an alternative x in a preference relation Pi is
r(x;Pi) = m−#L(x;Pi) + 1.
Definition 2.9 A social choice correspondence (SCC) F : ΠN −→ 2A\{∅}
is a mapping from ΠN into A, that selects a non-empty subset of A for each
possible preference profile of the society.
Definition 2.10 Given two SCCs F,G : ΠN −→ 2A\{∅}; the union of F
and G is a SCC F ∪G : ΠN −→ 2A\{∅} such that F ∪G(P ) = F (P )∪G(P )
∀P ∈ ΠN .
Definition 2.11 Given two SCCs F,G : ΠN −→ 2A\{∅}; the intersection of
F and G is a mapping F ∩G : ΠN −→ 2A such that F ∩G(P ) = F (P )∩G(P )
∀P ∈ ΠN .
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Remark 2.1 Since F ∩G(P ) can be empty for some P ∈ ΠN , the intersec-
tion of two SCCs need not to be a social choice correspondence.
Definition 2.12 For any two n-tubles a = (a1, ..., an) ∈ Zn and
b = (b1, ..., bn) ∈ Zn; a < b if and only if ai ≤ bi for i ∈ {1, ..., n} and aj < bj
for at least one j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Definition 2.13 The ceiling function dxe = min {n ∈ Z | n ≥ x} maps a
real number to smallest integer not less than x.
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Chapter 3
Maskin Monotonicity
Maskin monotonicity requires social choice correspondences to satisfy this
condition; if a social choice correspondences selects an alternative at a profile;
then this alternative must be selected in any other profile where for each agent
the lower contour set of this alternative does not shrink. Maskin monotonicity
is an intuitive condition; but also a very strong condition. Many well-known
social choice correspondences do not satisfy this condition. For example, if
indiffirences are not allowed in preference relations no scoring rule (Erdem
and Sanver 2005) are Maskin monotonic.
We now give the formal definition of Maskin monotonicity.
Definition 3.1 For any x ∈ A and P, P ′ ∈ ΠN with L(x;Pi) ⊆ L(x;P ′i )
∀i ∈ N , we say that P ′ is an improvement for x with respect to P .
Definition 3.2 A SCC F : ΠN → 2A\{∅} is called Maskin monotonic if
and only if it satisfies the following condition for all P ∈ ΠN and for all
x ∈ F (P ); if P ′ ∈ ΠN is an improvement for x with respect to P , then
x ∈ F (P ′).
We restate a propositon that was stated and proved by Maskin (1985).
Proposition 3.1 Given any two SCC’s F,G with F ∩G : ΠN → 2A\{∅}; if
F and G are Maskin monotonic then F ∩G is Maskin monotonic.
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Proof. Take any x ∈ A and any two profiles P, P ′ ∈ ΠN such that P ′ is
an improvement for x ∈ A with respect to P . Let x ∈ F ∩ G(P ), implies
x ∈ F (P ) and x ∈ G(P ). Since F and G are Maskin monotonic, we have
x ∈ F (P ′) and x ∈ G(P ′); implying x ∈ F ∩ G(P ′). This proves F ∩ G is
Maskin monotonic.
3.1 Maskin Monotonic Refinements
Definition 3.3 Given any two SCC’s F,G : ΠN −→ 2A\{∅}; G is called
Maskin monotonic refinement of F if and only if ∅ 6= G(P ) ⊆ F (P ) ∀P ∈
ΠN and G(P ) ⊂ F (P ) for some P ∈ ΠN , and G is Maskin monotonic.
It’s reasonable that usually minimal Maskin monotonic extension or max-
imal Maskin monotonic refinement of a non-monotonic social choice cor-
respondence is studied to reach a Maskin monotonic correspondence with
adding or subtraction as few as possible. For example, Erdem and Sanver
(2005) presents minimal Maskin monotonic extension of scoring rules. But in
our study we have a Maskin monotonic social choice correspondence, which
selects a large set of alternatives. So to refine this correspondence as much as
it is possible without dropping the Maskin monotonicity condition, we define
minimal Maskin monotonic refinement of a social choice correspondence.
Definition 3.4 G is called a minimal Maskin monotonic refinement of a
SCC F , if G is a Maskin monotonic refinement of F and @G′ such that G′
is a Maskin monotonic refinement of G.
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Chapter 4
Approval Voting
Approval voting is a voting procedure that works with the idea of indi-
viduals vote for as many alternatives as they want. So this procedure makes
individuals split the alternative set into two disjoint sets; which one set con-
tains approved alternatives and the other contains the rest of the alternatives.
Definition 4.1 Approval set Si, ∅ 6= Si ⊆ A, is the set of alternatives that
are approved by individual i. Then n-bundle S = (S1, ..., Sn) will be the
approval profile of society.
Definition 4.2 Given any preference relation Pi ∈ Π, the set Si is admissible
with respect to Pi if and only if r(x, Pi) = 1⇒ x ∈ Si and r(x, Pi) = m⇒ x /∈
Si. Given any preference profile P = (P1, ..., Pn), the n-tuple S is admissible
with respect to preference profile P if Si is admissible with respect to Pi for
all i ∈ N .
Definition 4.3 Given any preference relation Pi ∈ Π, the set Si is sincere
with respect to Pi if and only if x ∈ Si and yPix ⇒ y ∈ Si. Given any
preference profile P = (P1, ..., Pn), the n-tuple S is sincere with respect to
preference profile P if Si is sincere with respect to Pi for all i ∈ N .
Definition 4.4 For any x ∈ A, and approval profile S; the number
n(x;S) = #{i ∈ N : x ∈ Si} is the number of individuals approving x.
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Definition 4.5 Given an approval profile S, the voting procedure version of
approval voting is α(S) = {x ∈ A : n(x;S) ≥ n(y;S) ∀y ∈ A}.
Definition 4.6 Approval voting Fα : Π
N → 2A\{∅} is a social choice corre-
spondence with Fα(P ) = {x ∈ A : x ∈ α(S) for some S which is sincere with
respect to P}.
Brams and Sanver defined a critical approval profile for every alternative
at any preference profile, such that to be selected by approval voting prode-
cure at its critical approval profile is a necessary and sufficient condition for
an alternative to be an approval voting outcome (Brams and Sanver 2005).
Now we properly define the critical approval profile and state the condititon
as lemma. The proof of the lemma can be found in Brams and Sanver’s
paper.
Definition 4.7 An approval profile S = (S1, ..., Sn) is critical approval pro-
file for alternative x at preference profile P , if
Si = {y ∈ A : yPix} for all i ∈ N with r(x, Pi) 6= m and
Si = {y ∈ A : r(y, Pi = 1} for all i ∈ N with r(x, Pi) = m.
Lemma 4.1 For any P ∈ ΠN , a ∈ Fα(P ) if and only if a ∈ α(S) where S
is the critical approval profile for a at P .
Proposition 4.1 Fα is Maskin monotonic.
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Proof. Take any a ∈ A and any two preference profiles P, P ′ ∈ ΠN with
a ∈ Fα(P ) and P ′ is an improvement for a with respect to P . By Lemma
4.1, a ∈ Fα(P ) implies there exists critical approval profile S at P such that
a ∈ α(S). So n(a;S) ≥ n(b;S) ∀b ∈ A\{a}. Now let S ′ be the critical
approval profile for a at P ′. Since P ′ is an improvement for a with respect
to P , we have n(a;S ′) ≥ n(a;S), and n(b;S) ≥ n(b;S ′) ∀b ∈ A\{a}. So
n(a;S ′) ≥ n(b;S ′) ∀b ∈ A\{a} implying a ∈ Fα(P ′).
Definition 4.8 The approval index µ = (µ1, ..., µn) ∈ {1, ...,m − 1}N is a
n-tuble , where µi is the number of alternatives individual i approves.
Remark 4.1 Every preference profile P and approval index µ induces an
approval profile S(µ, P ) such that Si(µi, Pi) = {x ∈ A : r(x, Pi) ≤ µi}
∀i ∈ N .
Definition 4.9 Given preference profile P , approval index µ, and c ∈ {1, ...,m};
the (µ,c)-approval voting F cµ(P ) = {x ∈ A : n(x, S(µ, P )) ≥ c} is a mapping
which picks alternatives that is approved by at least c individuals.
Definition 4.10 Given approval index µ, the critical score is the number
γ(µ) = min
P∈ΠN
max
x∈A
n(x, S(µ, P )).
Remark 4.2 Given approval index µ, γ(µ) = d
∑
i∈N µi
m
e.
Proposition 4.2 For any approval index µ, (µ,c)-approval voting rule is a
social choice correspondence if and only if c ≤ γ(µ).
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Proof. ‘If’ Take any µ and c ≤ γ(µ). From the definition of γ(µ), we know
∀P ∈ ΠN ∃y ∈ A such that n(y, S(µ, P )) = max
x∈A
n(x, S(µ, P )) ≥ γ(µ) ≥ c,
implying y ∈ F cµ(P ). So we get F cµ(P ) 6= ∅ ∀P ∈ ΠN , which shows
(µ,c)-approval voting rule is a social choice correspondence.
‘Only if’ Take any µ, and let (µ,c)-approval voting rule F cµ(P ) be a SCC.
Assume for the contrary, c > γ(µ). From the definition of γ(µ), we know
∃P ∈ ΠN such that n(x, S(µ, P )) ≤ γ(µ) ∀x ∈ A. But
n(x, S(µ, P )) ≤ γ(µ) < c ∀x ∈ A gives F cµ(P ) = ∅. which contradicts with
the definition of SCC.
Remark 4.3 For given µ, we have the relation c < c′ ⇒ F cµ(P ) ⊇ F c′µ (P ),
that is derived from the definition of (µ,c)-approval voting . Our aim is to
find the minimal Maskin monotonic refinement of approval voting, so we will
use the case c = γ(µ), where F
γ(µ)
µ (P ) = {x ∈ A : n(x, S(µ, P )) ≥ γ(µ)} is
the finest (µ,c)-approval voting rule.
Proposition 4.3 Given approval index µ, the SCC F
γ(µ)
µ (P ) is Maskin mono-
tonic.
Proof. Take any µ, an alternative x ∈ A and any two preference profiles
P, P ′ ∈ ΠN with x ∈ F γ(µ)µ (P ) and P ′ is an improvement for x with respect
to P . Since x ∈ F γ(µ)µ (P ), we have n(x, S(µ, P )) ≥ γ(µ). Also P ′ is an
improvement for x with respect to P gives us n(x, S(µ, P ′)) ≥ n(x, S(µ, P )).
When we combine these two equations, we get
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n(x, S(µ, P ′)) ≥ n(x, S(µ, P )) ≥ γ(µ), which implies x ∈ F γ(µ)µ (P ′). Hence
F
γ(µ)
µ (P ) is Maskin monotonic.
Proposition 4.4 Given preference profile P ∈ ΠN and two approval indices
µ and µ′ with µ 6= µ′, having a relation between two indices (e.g. µ < µ′) does
not give a relation between two finest (µ,c)-approval voting rules F
γ(µ)
µ (P ) and
F
γ(µ′)
µ′ (P ) derived from them.
Proof. Take n = 9, A = {a, b, c, d}, µ = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1),
µ′ = (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2), and preference profile P as follows;
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9
a a a a b b b b b
c c c c c c c c c
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
Here we have γ(µ) = d
∑
i∈N µi
m
e = d9
4
e = 3, so F γ(µ)µ (P ) = {a, b}, and
γ(µ′) = d
∑
i∈N µ
′
i
m
e = d18
4
e = 5 so F γ(µ′)µ′ (P ) = {c}. So we have µ < µ′; but
F
γ(µ)
µ (P ) and F
γ(µ′)
µ′ (P ) are two disjoint sets.
Finest (µ,c)-approval voting rule for given µ, is a good candidate to be
a Maskin monotonic refinement of approval voting. But it may contain al-
ternatives that are not in approval voting. We show this by the following
example.
Example 1 Take n = 3, A = {a, b, c}, µ′ = (1, 2, 2) and preference profile
P as follows;
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P1 P2 P3
c c c
− a a
b − −
a b b
In this example γ(µ′) = d
∑
i∈N µ
′
i
m
e = d5
3
e = 2, so F γ(µ′)µ′ (P ) = {a, c}. But
a /∈ Fα(P ), because ∀µ we have n(c, S(µ, P )) = 3 and n(a, S(µ, P )) ≤ 2, so
n(a, S(µ, P )) < n(c, S(µ, P )).
Definition 4.11 Given approval index µ, the refined approval voting is a
SCC with RFµ(P ) = F
γ(µ)
µ (P ) ∩ Fα(P ) ∀P ∈ ΠN .
Remark 4.4 Given approval index µ, RFµ(P ) 6= ∅ ∀P ∈ ΠN .
Proof. Take any µ, and any P ∈ ΠN . Since F γ(µ)µ (P ) 6= ∅, ∃x ∈ F γ(µ)µ (P )
with n(x, S(µ, P )) ≥ n(y, S(µ, P )) ∀y ∈ F γ(µ)µ (P ). Futhermore, from the
definition of the finest (µ,c)-approval voting rule we have
n(x, S(µ, P )) ≥ n(y, S(µ, P )) ∀y ∈ A, implies x ∈ α(S). So x ∈ Fα(P ).
Proposition 4.5 For given µ, the refined approval voting RFµ(P ) is Maskin
monotonic refinement of approval voting.
Proof. Take any µ. Since finest approval voting rule F
γ(µ)
µ (P ) and approval
voting Fα(P ) are Maskin monotonic, by Proposition 3.1 we get the refined
approval votingRFµ(P ) is also Maskin monotonic. Also from the definition of
the refined approval voting; we know that RFµ(P ) is a refinement of approval
voting.
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Claim 4.1 For given µ, the refined approval voting RFµ(P ) is a minimal
Maskin monotonic refinement of approval voting.
15
References
[1] Alos-Ferrer C (2006). “A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting”.
Social Choice and Welfare 27: 621-625
[2] Brams SJ, Fishburn PC (1978). “Approval Voting”. The American Po-
litical Science Review 72: 831-847
[3] Brams SJ, Fishburn PC (1981). “Efficacy, Power and Equity under Ap-
proval Voting”. Public Choice 37: 425-434
[4] Brams SJ, Fishburn PC (1983). Approval Voting, Boston: Birkha¨user
[5] Brams SJ, Fishburn PC (1992). “Approval Voting in Scientific and En-
gineering Societies”. Group Decision and Negotiation 1: 41-55
[6] Brams SJ, Fishburn PC (2005). “Going From Theory to Practice: The
Mixed Success of Approval Voting”. Social Choice and Welfare 25: 457-
575
[7] Brams SJ, Sanver MR (2005). “Critical Strategies Under Approval Vot-
ing: Who Gets Ruled In And Ruled Out”. Electoral Studies 25: 287-305
[8] Erdem O, Sanver MR (2005). “Minimal Monotonic Extension of Scoring
Rules” Social Choice and Welfare 25: 31-42
[9] Laslier J-F, Van der Straeten K (2008). “A Live Experiment on Approval
Voting”. Experimental Economics 11: 97-205
16
[10] Laslier J-F, Sanver MR (2010). Handbook on Approval Voting, Springer
[11] Laslier J-F (2009). “The Leader Rule: A Model of Strategic Approval
Voting in Large Electorate”. Journal of Theoretical Politics 21: 133-136
[12] Lines M (1986). “Approval Voting and Strategy Analysis: A Venetian
Example”. Theory and Decision 20: 155-172
[13] Maskin E (1985). “The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium:
A Survey”, in Scial Goals and Social Organization, ed. by Hurwicz L,
Schmeidler D., Sonnenschein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
[14] Maskin E (1999). “Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality”. Review
of Economic Study 66: 23-38
[15] Weber RJ (1995). “Approval Voting”. The Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 9: 39-49
17
